Thursday, December 24, 2009

Can My Dog Take Rimadyl And Glucosamine

PENA-RUIZ


Pierre Bayle.
. Background
debate: SPIRITUAL FREEDOM
REPLY CHURCH CASEY WEAVER
RESPONSE TO THE CHURCH CASEY WEAVER
REPLY
Henri Pena-Ruiz
.
Mr. Peña-Ruiz:

His reply to my reflection on the "spiritual freedom" begins and ends similarly:

"The defenders of secularism, the debates should be raised from the rigor and intellectual honesty," says at the beginning.

"A true champion of secularism has better things to do than to face another in a manner so little respect from the point of view of ethical reflection. Plato said the philosophical dialogue is friendship (philia), even within the disagreement and discord not malicious (eris) or combat blind (polemos), "he concludes.

I do not know if he is wrong about the recipient, given the many articles I've posted about this problem, and they consistently rejected the notion of "secularism" (I speak of secularism and secular proclaim me), because secularism "in Spain is synonymous with religious freedom. This is not only thanks to the clergy, but also the foundation CIVES circles and close to it, encompassing well-known authors such as Gregorio Peces-Barba, or the theologian Juan José Tamayo, whose tagline is unchanged, "equal treatment of all religions." Make no mistake, then. My tagline, in any case, would be "equal treatment of all convictions (or, rather, individuals who belong to each of them, without considering the religious or nonreligious character of the same, spiritual or not spiritual of the same, knowing also that the same individual may simultaneously be ascribed to different beliefs of various kinds).

I think if there is something in which participants agree this debate is strongly polysemic character of the term "spirit" and therefore, the adjective "spiritual." And this is something that you shown in the generous and instructive tour of the philosophy to which I invited. Personally, I think it is appropriate at such polysemy book "spirit" and its adjective to the explanation of systems of thought or speech that is used, specifying the sense that charge in each of them.

specific In his book what we mean (Anthology Lay), the "spiritual freedom" refers to the belief or disbelief in God. In a more detailed, it is free to believe in God (in any of the available versions), of not believing in God (atheism) or no action on that belief or lack of belief (agnosticism).

wonder And you say that I draw a parallel between this notion and religious freedom, based on evidence that both approaches have no religious beliefs (freedom of having no religion at all) or beliefs that are not based belief in God (not believing in God or avoid rule) only in its negative side.

Moreover, I am not alone in noticing the parallels: the Vatican curia uses the terms "religious freedom" and "spiritual freedom" as synonyms. But good examples and quotes that show this parallelism have already been deployed throughout the debate, and does not seem appropriate to repeat them.

On the other hand, when you talk about political power, called "temporal power." Also, in my response to the kind replica of César Tejedor, I tried to go back to the significance of such conceptions.

As you understand, Mr. Pena-Ruiz, what worries me is the fact that you think about the secular nature of the way you see fit, but the possibility that a confusing terminology that seems to be assimilated by the movement secular in Spain.

Our history is very short secularist. However, the Constitution of the Second Republic is a masterful precision as regards freedom of conscience. And despite a tradition of "secularism" (not of secularism) from the amalgamation and childish philosophy, made to "save face", which was the krausismo: a pantheistic spiritualism at the same time, conceives of God as provident personal.

Moreover, the secular movement in Spain has some (limited, it is true) a solid foundation on which to build, legally and politically, in a language that does not move to the confusion. For example, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 25, 1981. There

interpreting the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 more directly linked to freedom of conscience, which is expressed as "freedom of thought, conscience, religion or whatever belief of free choice." That is, here is permitted and requires the deployment of all convictions (religious or not, spiritual or otherwise) in all its assertiveness, and not mere negations of others.

policy proposals are tested in practice. Talking to the "honesty" that you preach, do you think que avanzaríamos en el laicismo modificando el artículo 16 de la Constitución, cambiando su enunciado por el de “libertad espiritual”? En lugar de la Proposición de ley de libertad de pensamiento, de conciencia, o de cualesquiera convicciones de libre elección, ¿avanzaría en el laicismo una Proposición de ley de libertad espiritual, para sustituir la actual Ley orgánica de libertad religiosa?

A mí la respuesta me parece evidente, por eso dejo al margen sus alusiones personales y sus argumentos ad hominem, en el convencimiento de que nuestros lectores saben leer.

Atentamente.

Juan Francisco González Barón.

Friday, December 18, 2009

Building A Tolerance To Cats

REPLY


.
following is the replica of Henri Peña-Ruiz to the "spiritual freedom."
. Background
debate: SPIRITUAL FREEDOM

http://laicismoypolitica.blogspot.com/2009/11/la-libertad-espiritual.html
REPLY CHURCH CASEY WEAVER
http://laicismoypolitica.blogspot .com/2009/12/replica-de-cesar-tejedor.html
RESPONSE OF THE CHURCH CASEY WEAVER
http://laicismoypolitica.blogspot.com/2009/12/respuesta-cesar-tejedor-de-la -iglesia.html
.

ON MY VOCABULARY.
Among defenders of secularism, discussions should be approached from the rigor and intellectual honesty. This means that in no case should fall within the amalgam, the minimalist approach so typical of the positions that criticize or attack the suggestion controversial or biased. With this basic principle I intend to respond to Juan Francisco González Barón (JFGB in text from now), whose great merit is to have played a decisive role in the founding and subsequent implementation of our partnership Lay Europe, so beloved both my right as my heart. However, the terms in which he couches his arguments critical of my vocabulary at least surprised me.
.
first summarize the four main criticisms directed me JFGB, and reiterated again the thread of the publication of the Anthology secular work written with my friend Neil Weaver of the Church in order to provide anyone seeks to defend and promote secularism a manual solid articulating conceptual clarification and reference texts.
.
In his first critique, JFGB accuses me of having used a vocabulary of theological type when I turn to the notions of spiritual choice and spiritual freedom. In his second criticism, related to the first, taken for granted an identity between two expressions are, however, quite different: spiritual freedom and religious freedom. This is a very surprising amalgam and not shown. In his third critique, JFGB accuses me of maintaining a reductive typology of the widest possible range of worldviews, a term which, however, I have not used at any time. She refers in this case the distinction I usually among the convictions in relation to the existence of God, religious belief, that said, the atheism, which denies it, and agnosticism, which suspended the trial. Finally, in his latest criticism, intended to instruct JFGB me about my alleged "complicity" with the notion of religious freedom, a notion which, however, never use, if is not to criticize it as irrelevant. Finally, JFGB seems to say that hardly matters to the end of the day if I think something other than what he gives me to read my words, since they inevitably have consequences he attributes to them. In short, one of two things: either I am an accomplice to the opponents of secularism, or something to explain thoroughly and responsibly do not measure the extent of my vocabulary. Recognize that the suggestion is incisive, and quite unpleasant as it replaces the argument by invective.
.
Thank you, dear JFGB for having tried "to correct" ... but before we know if indeed I do, I have to give some explanations. After to have raised, I'm not sure you need to change my views.
.
The first criticism is, therefore, that the fact of using the term spiritual option would inevitably return to a theological vocabulary, which is unacceptable for a layman. This criticism is clearly a view of intentions, it leaves me dismayed to come from a man as religious as JFGB. I maintain that the notion of spirituality is very different than religion, and that the religious version of spirituality is not just a particular way in which this can be developed. There are non-religious forms of spirituality, despite the fact that religions have tried for nearly twenty centuries of life take over spiritual and monopolize it. First, it is important to distinguish the spiritual life, expressed especially through science, philosophy, art, and all activities of the human conscience, including religious belief, which is only a version of that particular. It should also distinguish the activity of the spirit of what their ontological support. Spiritualists believe that you can only account for this activity if we assume the hypothesis of the existence of a reality distinct from the body, while the materialists claim that matter can think, in its ultimate level of organization, and therefore can explain this spiritual activity (it is the thesis Engels in his Dialectics of Nature, where he speaks of "thinking mind", "supreme flowering of the art"). Neither Marx nor Engels, materialistic well known, leaving the term "spirit" or "spirituality" while making a very methodical philosophical critique of spiritualism. Can we say that they are inconsistent, or even unconsciously prisoners of a theological vocabulary? Hardly. Simply think about the spiritual life does not necessarily mean "spiritual", if by this we mean an assertion of the immateriality of thought. Therefore, it does not mean necessarily subject dualistic vocabulary of religion.
.
Lucretius, materialistic thinker, does not give spiritual life intangible support. Thus, also writes in the third book of De natura rerum that the spirit ("animus" or "spiritus") consists of atoms very subtle movement so fast. Similarly, Diderot sees a carrier material essence of life itself thinking. It is religion that advocates an ontology spiritualist and says a dualism between the body (which has the characteristic of "extension"), and the spirit (which has no "extension"). Moreover, it should be noted to JFGB that the Greek psyche and the Latin word spiritus in the first instance refer to something material, meaning "breath of air." When Hegel says that the pyramids of Egypt or the Renaissance paintings are spiritual works, makes widespread use of the word spirit (geist in German). Grant a monopoly of spirituality to religion is to make a concession unexpected and confirm one of the arguments on the other hand is used to make her believe she was not given any kind of life the human spirit. JFGB could also be read to Spinoza, the great thinker secular advocate of a spiritualist spirituality. The soul (mens) is for him the idea of \u200b\u200bbody, self-awareness. Closer to us in time, as a philosopher André Comte-Sponville has written a book entitled L'esprit de l'Atheism (Editions Grasset, Paris), which explicitly uses the term "atheist spirituality." In short, I vindicate the use of the term "spiritual" without being accused of favoring thus unconsciously to religion! If I had to leave certain terms under the pretext of having been used by religions, then there would have to give even the term "secular" (secular, Laika), used by the Church to refer to who plays no official role in the religious institution, unlike the "clergy." Will there then be called differently in our movement "secular Europe, which would be using and theological vocabulary?
.
The second charge stems from the wording of the first. Intellectually, it is very odd for the request in principle it contains. According JFGB, in referring to spiritual freedom would surreptitiously referring to religious freedom. Here is an amalgam not shown, made authoritatively, between spiritual and religious. For my part, I have never defended the notion of religious freedom. " I have always criticized clearly saying that this "freedom" refers not only to a particular case of the only freedom would be defended, namely, freedom of conscience, which is neither religious nor atheist. I invite JFGB to find a single line in my books that say otherwise. All I have heard in my lectures know very well what I mean: I have always criticized the notion of religious freedom, stating that to the defense of a principle we should not give never a reductionist view, but bring your extension more general. Proof: If religious freedom is the freedom to join a religion, so is to change religion, or not to join any. Would you call then "freedom atheist" freedom of not adhering to a religion? This is the parallel that I often do to invalidate the notion of religious freedom and saying that the only acceptable principle for its universality, is the freedom of conscience, or spiritual freedom. Stress, therefore, that freedom of conscience implies the autonomy of view as the foundation and feeds secular education. As to the notion of spiritual freedom, is of the same general way as that of religious freedom, since freedom requires that every human being should have to dispose of his spirit, his spiritual multiforme. If we admit the irreducibility of spirituality to religion, as I think we should do in view of the foregoing arguments, I do not see any way why the appeal to the notion of spiritual freedom is equivalent to a renewal of the concept of religious freedom. Amalgam and reductive vision are not rational proofs but controversial instruments fit very little to the ethics of thought.
.
In his third critique, JFGB accused me of proposing a reductive typology of possible range of worldviews. However, I've never tried to build such a type, nor have I ever talked of "worldviews," but I'm after an end much more modest. It is not only to mention the different attitudes of men to religious belief and not try to make an exhaustive inventory of the great representations of the world, very general term which includes in fact the multiplicity of elements involved in the design of human existence. As a philosopher and professor of philosophy, I am too aware of the diversity of these conceptions and their wealth as to try to reduce it to a tripartite simplistic. Here again, we are entitled to ask whether JFGB referred to my writings or others for whom he replaces. In fact, the distinction I make usually concerns only to convictions regarding the existence of God, religious belief, which states that existence of atheism, which denies it, and agnosticism, which suspended the trial. Before inventing the reproach of "simplistic", JFGB should ask what I mean when I propose this type. This will avoid holding an appreciation for the less hasty and unfounded.
.
Finally, in his latest criticism, JFGB suggested that maybe I do not think what he gives me, but this is really the effect of my vocabulary, from your point of view contestable. In short, is to say that I would not have measured the extent of what I write, and good a teacher you remember me! I would like to show that its interpretation JFGB forced and biased my views can be defended only from his own reading, and that is not legitimate to invent a chasm between the meaning I give to my terms and that follows from them without my knowing . JFGB is free to interpret things their way, but not to attribute a difference between not accept what I write and what some readers may interpret from what I write. Moreover, JFGB speaks of "complicity" on my part with theology, which means that I would subjectively responsible for the misunderstandings that he envisions, not only objectively. If words have meaning, the "accomplice" is intellectually and psychologically responsible for the representations that he raises for his vocabulary. Hence the question posed JFGB: Am I conscious or unconscious of his trial harmful effects of my speech? In the first case, it would be "difficult." In the second case, would not have enough intellectual domain. Of course, I reject the two hypotheses, not for pride, but simply because of the requirement to observe the utmost rigor. In compliance with this requirement I have developed the preceding arguments.
.
conclude. The controversy precipitated, reductive analysis, and prevent unscrupulous amalgam feed a peaceful dialogue. A true champion of secularism has better things to do than to face another in a manner so little respect from the point of view of ethical reflection. Plato said that the philosophical dialogue is friendship (philia), even within the disagreement and discord not malicious (eris) or combat blind (polemos).
.
SEE THE ANSWER TO HENRI PENA-RUIZ:

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

How Long After Va Appraisal To Buy A House

Henri Pena-Ruiz RESPONSE TO THE CHURCH CASEY WEAVER CASEY WEAVER


myth of the cave.
. Background
debate:
SPIRITUAL FREEDOM
REPLY CHURCH CASEY WEAVER
http://laicismoypolitica.blogspot.com/ 2009/12/replica-de-cesar-tejedor.html
.
After requesting authorization, the Dec. 7 posted on this blog your reply to my reflection (24 November) on Lay Anthology, a book recently published in Spain and that you co-author. On this question the notion of "spiritual freedom" as appropriate to understand and disclose what is secularism. Today I would like to respond

to the replica, in the belief that a calm discussion may help to clarify our respective positions, and, come to an agreement or not, it is worth making them known in secular circles.

However, before I express my thanks for paying attention to my concerns terminology and have had the courtesy to respond to them in a manner so cordial, neat and teaching. Because, in fact, I share with you the feeling that our differences are more than lexical content, but we both know that language is never innocent and that the language can betray our intentions and lead to political consequences

unwanted ... I have argued that the "spiritual freedom" sets in motion a restrictive reasoning parallels that of the so-called religious freedom (and even exacerbated it), almost indistinguishable from the claim of "autonomy of the spiritual realm" voceada from the Vatican Curia and, ultimately, puts on the shirt secular thought in theological language, which in no way serves the understanding and dissemination of our project. In my opinion, confuses and hinders.

Given these statements, you reason that being chosen as the drive shaft the notion of "spiritual freedom" responds to the demands of philosophical rigor that must be free prejudice and bigoted thinking of those raised on Franco, associate "spirit" and "spiritual" to meanings imposed by the rules. In short, if I understand correctly, it is restoring their original meaning.

Well, if I must be frank, that does not silence my concerns. As far as antiquity is concerned (and you quoted me the example of Epicurus as "spiritual option"), "spirit" Greek words translated as "nous" and "pneuma", sometimes associated with notions such as psyche, mind, intellect and others as being located at a different level and above. The term "spiritus" Latin for "breath", "breath" ... In short, this is a term so many meanings and so controversial that most scholars of ancient thought rejects the translation, simply repeated words "nous" and "pneuma", explaining its precise meaning in each context footnotes. Moreover, an author as close to analytic philosophy (and, therefore, particularly sensitive to the rigor of terminology) as Ferrater Mora, adds to the requirement that the term "spirit" is banished from the philosophical debates. Should be reserved only exposure systems of thought which acquires a precise meaning, as in the case of Scholastic, to its meaning in all subsequent idealism of Descartes (which is synonymous with "soul") to Kant, or, more recently, in the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel.

If we use "spiritual freedom" in the name of philosophical rigor, we are resigned to accept the role of "handmaiden of theology" assigned to the intellectual discipline to which you ascribe. Or, from Descartes to Kant, to put God as the sole guarantee of truth and / or ethical foundation. As Hegel and the "immanence" of the spirit is concerned, ending a dualism (false dualism, as our poor world has only one really sensitive surrogate) which dates back to Plato, well do you know which is founded on the incarnation of God in Christ. The reasoning is quite religious, although not linked to any particular Christian church. Not surprisingly, for Feuerbach, is a streamlined theology (I prefer to say "secular", but my personal choice is closer to the political discourse, religious and sociological as a linguist, found that the "philosophy", from the point of view academic, not just the yoke platonic).

In short, philosophical rigor you would lead to the choice of "spiritual freedom" to discuss policy proposals (specifically, the proposal secularist), I philological rigor leads me to face directly into the language of each proposal, without preconceptions terminology foreign to them.

But anyway, these short walks philosophy (yours and mine) in the case under discussion, there are plenty full. The notion that "spiritual freedom" straightjacket secular thought in theological language, the book we discussed (Anthology Lay) is something that is completely explained in the introduction to it, without leaving their pages. There reads:

"Some men believe in God. Others do not. And still others are agnostics. These are the three major types of spiritual options. And such is the reality that we can start to outline the problem of the relationship between the temporal and spiritual life. "

is, the intent of the book is addressing the issue of the relationship between the temporal and ... If speaking of "temporal power" the most elementary hermeneutic of language tells us that implicitly accepts a power that is not an eternal power, spiritual power, and this, I present on behalf of what you will, is approach called ecclesiastical approach theological ... Because you will agree with me, the notion of "temporal power" is coined in the early Middle Ages by the Augustinians. Y "temporal power" is not synonymous with "political power", but a very particular and tendentious way of conceiving the latter.

The theological foundation of the "temporal power" is based on the Gospel statement addressed to the apostle Peter, "Upon this rock I will build my church, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. "

Thus, the political power emanating from God, lies the successor of Peter as Pope. In principle, the "temporal power" refers to the power of the Pope in his domain, with its own currency, its government, its army ... Where the papacy does not come so directly, it tries to recreate the moral monopoly achieved in the Roman Empire under Theodosius the Great. That dream comes true Roman curia with the coronation of Charlemagne as Emperor. And here comes into play paraphernalia that has remained until very recent times: the "alleged" Emperor gives up his crown, symbolizing the so-called "temporal power", the Pope, as the only rightful recipient of the same, who, in time, returns to the Emperor for that, as secular arm, becomes the defender of the Church and its interests, thus establishing a special relationship of allegiance.

The formation of powerful kingdoms, which no longer are grouped under the aegis of an empire, makes the so-called political Augustinism renew their proposals, negotiating the exercise of surrogate time with each of them. This is something that is generalized from the XIII century, without fundamentally changing the "philosophical theology" deep, and lasts until the liquidation of the ancien regime and in regimes such as Franco ("Caudillo of Spain the grace of God "), virtually until today.

Well, walking through the historical reality (and not a spiritualized reality), would you still find so lacking in rigor terminology which states that the introduction to the book we talk and the thread of the same language in a straitjacket ecclesiastical and theological?

I think that policy proposals (and in particular the proposal secular) has its own language, and that a rule-based methodology is to analyze them as such, without a priori conceptual.

Another thing reminds me a little humor Benjamin Farrington cool to talk about Plato. As you know, to learn astronomy, it should be noted the stars and then translate, as far as possible, such comments to mathematical or geometric terms (which, fortunately, did the sailors of his day). No, as the stars are "have" to move as the geometric models, prohibits the direct gaze. You also aware that, at this point, Aristotle remained faithful to his master, and thus we have the intellectual heritage that we have had in our historical fate.

But Plato was not limited in his delirium to astronomy. During his stay in Syracuse, where Dionysius I allowed to spread their policy proposals, he taught geometry to the ruling classes (And also, apparently, political practices must reflect the geometric models). The dust raised (the figures were drawn with sticks on the dirt floor) was such that, due to protests, almost kicked out of Sicily ...

Today, there are no observable policy proposals that claim of "autonomy spiritual ", the" spiritual power ", the" spiritual life ", except those from the major religions, especially the Catholic ... I do not mean the policy as meaning" narrow "the term (government or games), but in the broad sense in organizations such as Amnesty International or the Association itself Secular Europe try to influence public opinion for the vindication of certain human rights as priorities.

In this regard, I invite you to read our charter program, our plan of actions and campaigns, and our latest Proposition Law on Freedom of Conscience:

http://www.europalaica.com/

The " autonomy of the spiritual realm, "as the" religious freedom ", it serves the interest of the Catholic Church and other religions to operate in and from the government and thus higher of laws. To avoid further trouble, we also invite you to read the article "The political considerations of unbelief" (2007), which attempt to deploy these observations:

http://www.europalaica.com/colaboraciones/LA_CONSIDERACION_POLITICA_DE_LA_INCREENCIA_DICIEMBRE_2007.pdf

hope that these lines express the reason for my concern, and thanks again for the attention and deference that has had me, you are greeted cordially.

Juan Francisco González Barón, founding member of the European Association Lay.
.
HENRI SEE THE REPLY OF ROCK-RUIZ:

Monday, December 7, 2009

Cervix High/soft Days Before Period




Adjunto la réplica de César Tejedor de la Iglesia a mi artículo publicado en este blog en noviembre sobre la "libertad espiritual".
.
***
.
Es motivo de orgullo y satisfacción para mí que la reciente publicación de nuestro libro Antología laica. 66 textos comentados para comprender el laicismo haya servido para dinamizar el debate y la discusión constructiva sobre los conceptos, muchas veces controvertidos, y las implicit in the secular. I think this kind of thinking is very advantageous to avoid falling into the stagnation so characteristic of other streams of thought clerical, of which we still suffer the consequences, and even more advantageous, if possible, when he endorsed the criticism is a major defenders of secularism in Spain. Not surprisingly, the potential controversy that has arisen from our book reading respond to a conceptual problem, but not content. In this sense, I agree with everything that you advocate in your article, and understand that the discussion is in the level of the terms used. I would say a philosopher who disagree with the "letter" but not the "spirit" (To avoid creating more confusion, we would say no more on the content).
.
In fact, I totally agree with you when you say that the English Constitution, freedom of conscience so clumsy restricted to religious freedom in fact seen as lacking any kind of conviction that is not religious. So we wanted to complain, like you, in our book (text XVII. English Constitution. "Conflicting constitutional principles"). It is unacceptable that in one article (16.3) is established by the Establishment Clause principle of State ("No religion shall have a state character), and just then considered as the only valid religious beliefs, even going to legitimize relations with a particular institution, listed under name, which stands as representative of a particular religious belief ("The public authorities shall take into account the religious beliefs English society and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation relations with the Catholic Church and other confessions. ") And you and I cry: What? Do the beliefs that can not be considered religious do not deserve the same consideration? Pierre Bayle and demonstrated, and we have explained in the book, that the spectrum of belief human can not be reduced to various religious beliefs, like the religions no longer existed a total lack of conviction. In his book Thoughts on the different comet (XVIII text) takes a simple idea, but powerful: in the same way that religious believers have been criminals, atheists have been virtuous. Bayle did not mean that the only alternative to belief beyond atheism. His thoughts went far beyond. What I wanted to show was that the defense of human values \u200b\u200bwas not necessarily based on religious belief, as some thinkers of his time clerical intended. A believer can be virtuous, but also can be an atheist, an agnostic a Lamaist or a Buddhist, or even someone whose beliefs are not recognized by any preset cliché.
.
Of course, if the English Constitution is a reflection of this reductionism would restrict the whole possible range of convictions and beliefs, it is even more the Organic Law on Religious Freedom 1980, and Penal Code, as set out with a unbeatable.
.
However, if we want to be strict with the language we use, I can not agree with you when to extend this critique of the concept of "spiritual freedom" that we propose in our book (and corresponding "options espirituales”). Dice que la llamada libertad espiritual es una noción completamente paralela a la llamada “libertad religiosa”, y por lo tanto, cómplice de la misma. Y un poco más adelante añale que utilizar la expresión “libertad espiritual” no solo reproduce este razonamiento restrictivo y opresivo, sino que lo agudiza.
.
En primer lugar, he de advertir que el libro lo hemos escrito como filósofos de la laicidad, y no como polemistas. Así lo hemos puesto de manifiesto en la última frase del prólogo. Un filósofo tiene que ser muy riguroso con los conceptos que utiliza y no caer en el error de traicionar el sentido genuino de los términos por culpa de different historical prejudices. The term "spirituality" does not refer primarily to the "religion." And in Greek philosophy, before the formation of the systematic corpus of the three great monotheistic religions, there are examples of forms of spirituality inherent to human being, requiring no transcendent reference. Such is the case of Epicurus, who rejected the finalism providential and all divine intervention in human affairs, making pleasure the only beginning and end of human action (see text of our book IV). And yet explained how it can be the most virtuous of men. In this regard, if wants, "spirituality" is ontologically and historically prior to religion as we understand it now.
.
Therefore, to identify spirituality with religion or religious language is the victim of a deeply rooted historical prejudice in Spain nacionalcatolicismo the sad tradition of Franco's regime still remains very much alive in many aspects of English society. Only from bigoted and biased thinking that is the product of that education Restrictive admit that "spirituality" is a parallel concept of "religion." Even we are victims of this confusion, because the term "spirituality" sounds to us immediately religion, specifically Catholicism, because of that historical prejudice rooted in our tradition.
.
is necessary to explain, from the distanced plane of philosophy, the sense we use the term "spirituality." Understand spirituality a way to transcend the merely material providing a certain sense of our being and acting in the world. The spirituality lies in the consciousness, which is what distinguishes us from other beings on earth (I can not escape the complexities of the philosophical problem the duality of matter / spirit, which is a reformulation of the problem brain / mind). Only human beings have consciousness, and because she is able to give his existence a certain sense. Every human being develops his spirituality in some way. Now there are many ways to give meaning to our existence and what we do with it. In other words, there are many forms of spirituality is only one religion, but not unique. Hence, we consider spirituality as a natural characteristic, essential, human, and not religion. Religion is not the only way of expressing human spirituality, and of course, need not be (Far) more excellent than others. The German philosopher Hegel said that the Spirit was developed through three things: art, philosophy and religion. I do not mean to say that Hegel was right, or just to develop the spiritual life through these three things. But I do subscribe to the intuition that Hegel had to show that religion is only one way among others to develop the spiritual life. In short, religion and religious beliefs have no monopoly on spirituality. Using Aristotelian terminology, one could say that spirituality is the "genre" of no religious belief is more than a "kind".
.
Therefore, the identification that you report in our approach between "spiritual freedom" and "religious freedom", making them accomplices in an absurd reduction of the wide spectrum of beliefs that lie or could lie in the human consciousness, has no foundation other than the confusion of the National-clerical tradition in Spain has created in the collective imagination. It is therefore designed such confusion as a historical bias that goes against the true meaning of the terms "spirituality" and "religion." Spiritual freedom, therefore, identifies with "Freedom of conscience" and not "religious freedom", a term absurd, misleading and restrictive (as well has shown you), as would the term "freedom atheist" or "freedom agnostic."
.
understand that some expressions out of context of our book will enable them to interpret our analysis shows that there are no more options spiritual than religious belief (as if there were no non-religious beliefs), atheism and agnosticism. Perhaps at the time of writing the book, in some part, have also been victims of this historical bias. However, a reading Overall the book makes clear that spiritual freedom or freedom of conscience includes believers, any sign, atheists and agnostics. Of course, there are ways of belief are not necessarily tied to belief in a personal God, unit, etc. You quote the Lamaism or animism. There are even forms of belief that are embedded within a materialistic approach. Marx, for example, an activist in favor of real equality between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that would end the class struggle in society from the perspective of historical materialism, which reinterpreted Hegel's dialectical materialism (we must not forget that defense of moral values, as freedom, equality, etc. no longer a way to give meaning to our actions and our being in the world, and therefore beyond the mere realm of the material). For Marx, the basis of this search for equality did not come from a transcendental instance ("Religion is the opium of the people"), but of the inherent design of the human being as the bearer of some natural rights, including the right to dispose of their own workforce and its product, which were being violated by the progressive industrial capitalism. Marx believed in equality. So, you pose the question: "The lively community of Nigeria does not believe in God, but numinous beings, Are atheists or agnostics? ". I would have no problem in considering them within the Christian spiritual choice, although that kind of belief does not correspond to the belief in the Christian God. So when we say there are three main options (spiritual beliefs of any sign, atheism and agnosticism) do not believe that fall into the simplistic reductionism that you report. We have even advocated the same as you, through the texts of D'Holbach and Bayle, when reporting that atheism can not be considered as a purely negative option (not believe), as if atheists lacked positive views about moral virtue or philosophy. Worth for Marx. All the atheists would be shocked if you were to suggest that not believing in God means believing in nothing, Dovstoievski style ("If God does not exist, everything is permitted ..") The defenders of secularism, if we want to be consistent, we must give a Dovstoievski slap on and those who advocate that the scope of the belief is confined to religious belief. I think you'll agree with me perfectly at this point.
.
If I have explained well, there will be clear that when we use the term "spiritual freedom" (and the three great spiritual options), in a strict sense, apart from certain times historical prejudices and places, we are referring to a universal principle inherent in secular thought, which is not far adhered to no brace or cast particularist, such as the theological language.
.
are further answered the criticism that finds the roots of this expression in Augustine's theological language (I would not have ever beatified: see text XII), which raises the dichotomy spiritual world / underworld. The term "spiritual freedom" and its meaning is not within the theological approach of Augustine of Hippo (in this case would have been legitimate criticism that you raise in denouncing the principles of thought secularist remain "closeted in the language of theology.") It should rather be understood within the dichotomy of matter / spirit, which is a philosophical and not theological, as I have tried to briefly above.
.
other hand, you criticize the idea that religion is linked to autonomy of the spiritual world with respect to the temporal world. Religion, while believing that unites the faithful freely around some dogmas and worship to a particular, not be confused with clericalism, which is the illegitimate political drift of religion, namely, the pursuit of domination of one particular religion on public sphere through the acquisition of public power. A clear example of clericalism in Spain, we have continued statements and actions of the English Episcopal Conference. But we must not fall into the error of identifying the English Episcopal Conference with all the Catholic faithful of Spain. Not surprisingly, many English Catholics do not feel represented by a fan and clerical body that is far from what should be a religion. You hear everywhere the imprint "I believe in God, but not priests."
.
Secularism, in order to enforce equal treatment of all spiritual beliefs or options, must fight clericalism all seeking to hold temporal power of the ideological underpinnings of a particular creed. We have to distinguish between religion and clericalism. Secularism is not against religion, just as there is against atheism or any other spiritual choice, but is against all forms of clericalism. Clericalism, the sign that is, is by definition a "political instrumentalization of any particular ideology (including religion), and therefore violates the principle of freedom of conscience or spiritual freedom, and against the principle of equality treatment of all citizens, regardless of the option spiritual to freely accede.
.
Many religious believers, who live their belief as an "intimate persuasion of his conscience" (Bayle), within the limits of privacy, would be offended when you suggested that "religions (particularly monotheistic) are political, nothing more than political and purely political. " Without going any further, other authors included in our anthology, Leopoldo Alas "Clarín" explained how this can be an advocate for the principles of secularism without ceasing to be Catholic, simply separating the private and public spheres, and confining the experience of Catholic religion to the private sphere. Victor Hugo, Catholic confessed, saying "I want the State to its own, and to his Church." E Immanuel Kant, Protestant pietistic clericalist denounced the practice of historic Christianity (what he called "the black book of historic Christianity"), which had nothing to do with what should be the genuine experience of the Christian religion, regardless of all clericalism.
.
Only in this sense, secularism, and the political project of democracy, should take into account the "autonomy of the spiritual order": Everyone is free to follow their own convictions, which can never be imposed nor prohibited. In this sense a confessional state that recognizes an official religion, is "tarnishing the autonomy of the spiritual" in the sense that it is imposing a particular option to all citizens. The English state, from my point of view, remains a religious state, as illegitimate government continues to grant privileges to the Catholic Church to make, though not "impose"-in the strong sense of the word religion to citizens and not being Catholic does not prohibit, it "guides", I am using this term too lenient, the consciousness in a very determined and very "bad faith "in the Sartrean sense of the term (think of the existence of Catholic religious instruction in schools and public institutions, professors of religion made by the bishops finger, and paid with public money).
.
political order can not interfere, therefore, the different experiences of particular beliefs, which must remain at all times within the scope of individual freedom, provided that these particular beliefs remain within the limits set by the universal principles justice and human rights. And here there is no discrepancy between what you propose and what we have outlined in the book. I identify fully with his words when he says that in a democratic, secular, it is important to respect the principle of non interference by public authorities in matters of conscience ... "but this is an unavoidable requirement while such groups do not commit crimes and not to restrain the human rights. And if they do, not only the intervention is legitimate but is required by those who are violated. And here there can be no emergency treatment or privileges because they have a spiritual character. " Obviously, when an act violates the universal principles of justice or human rights, the act ceases to have a private, and becomes a public, but takes place within a religious community. This is precisely the argument that was used in France to ban public schools of the Republic the Islamic headscarf and other conspicuous religious signs. In the case of Spain is even clearer: in a forum recently I expressed my view that the English Episcopal Conference, and his spokesman Martinez Camino, should be judged by some of his public statements. For example, when the Catholic deputies warned that if, in exercising their role as Members (public sphere), defend or do nothing at the proposal for reform of abortion law will be committing "public sin" and are to exist for "heresy" and will be punished, I understand that beyond the limits of freedom of expression, a right enshrined in the constitution. Pretending to retrieve the terms "heresy" or "public sin" within a religious community seems too dangerous to be overlooked, but if that's not tolerable, seeking to rescue their binding power in the field of exercise of the duty in the public domain so blatantly crosses all boundaries of what should be tolerated.
.
I invite you to read an article by Fernando Savater less rigorous and informative nature of what he usually does, entitled "Is it tolerable religious tolerance?", published in the journal Isegoría 39. Journal of Moral and Political Philosophy. This article Savater supports exactly the same as you and me: it is important to tolerate different spiritual options. But there are limits. For example, when the clergy lobbyists who stand as representatives of a religion claim that biology classes in college are given a kind of creation, rather than studying the theory of evolution, then tolerance is far less convincing. In my book, should we tolerate it?, expose the same idea, namely that tolerance is a virtue only when not exceed the limits that separate the service. "Tolerating" outrages against human dignity, the freedom of having one's convictions and free, or "tolerate" public threats that continuously poured over the media senior representatives of the Catholic Church in Spain is no longer a virtue. It becomes a habit. In order to consider ourselves tolerant have to be very clear about boundaries that can not happen, and if you cross is legitimate from the point of view of justice does not tolerate.
.
agree with you when reporting to certain political parties today (The PSOE between them) that do not look for trouble, disturb the true meaning of "autonomy of the spiritual realm, making it a kind of permissiveness all where anything goes if it comes disguised in the garb of religion, even the most serious attempts of violating human rights. Accordingly, I believe for example that we should not remain indifferent to the statements of Angel Gabilondo, minister of education, when faced with the question of the relevance to ban crucifixes in public schools, said the decision should be adopted by each particular school. Shocking and intolerable lack of public accountability.
. Thanking
de nuevo su reflexión crítica, espero haber intentado explicar mi posición en esta controversia, que considero eminentemente conceptual, con la mayor claridad posible.
.
VER LA RESPUESTA A CÉSAR TEJEDOR DE LA IGLESIA: